Our study seeks to prove that German Stability Culture is a myth. The concept is a core legitimizing element of economic policy discourse in Germany and used regularly to juxtapose Germany and northern Europe and the euro area periphery. Using Eurobarometer surveys we construct a measurement for Stability Culture which is based on the priority assigned to the fight against inflation. Our empirical analysis covers the 2002 to 2010 timespan and includes 27 European Union Member States. Our results show that the distinction between northern states with an allegedly strong and southern states with an allegedly weak Stability Culture is a myth. Controlling for actual inflation, we find that the northern Member States with an allegedly high Stability Culture are less concerned with price stability than the rest of the EU.
Introduction
The concept of Stability Culture has been manipulated both as a diagnosis of and remedy to the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Stability Culture refers to a common policy perspective the primary concern of which is price stability. The Sovereign Debt Crisis, so the argument propagated by Stability Culture champions goes, was brought on by a failure to establish a firm German-style Stability Culture across the Eurozone. In the words of the former Bundesbank president Helmut Schlesinger 3 Eurobarometer surveys we demonstrate that the population in the core countries of the alleged Stability Culture stronghold are less inflation averse than in the rest of the EU.
The history and politics of Stability Culture
We understand the term Stability Culture as a paradigm of price stability shared by politicians, central bankers and the population at large which is considered to constitute a vital framework for the market economy and the preservation of social peace (see Dyson 1998) . 'Stable money', so the argument goes, 'is the foundational contract of democracy' (Brüderle 2013) . In this study we focus on Stability Culture as political culture, and therefore on public opinion in the EU member states, not the views of political elites. Because this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to systematically investigate Stability Culture across EU countries, the best starting point is the foundation of this political and socio-economic culture. At its core, Stability Culture is not an elite phenomenon. Rather it is firmly anchored within political and socio-economic culture. In its origins, this 'culture of stability' is considered by many to be a fundamental characteristic of German political culture (Mertes 1994: 6) . Along similar lines, Richter (1991) understands Stability Culture as a 'social concept' anchored in the consciousness of the population.
Stability Culture has also been considered a key element of the success or failure of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (see Bofinger et al. 1998) . German architects of EMU insisted that the Eurozone had to be founded on a durable 'stabilityorientation' (dauerhafte Stabilitätsorientierung) (Dyson 2015) . This ordo-liberal
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4 blueprint for monetary integration goes beyond political elites. Hayo (1998) claims that the design of the European Central Bank (ECB) is merely one part of a stability regime that must be reinforced with public attitudes in favour of price stability.
Public opinion is thus said to become a 'significant precondition' of the success and longevity of EMU (ibid. 244).
The focus of this contribution on actual inflation aversion of individuals also functions as a much needed reality check. The widespread German discourse on The policy prescriptions of Stability Culture entail a mantra of fiscal restraint with the aim of achieving price stability. One of the alleged by-products of a Keynesian approach to demand management is higher inflation. Cottarelli et al. (1998) in people haunted by the spectre of 'laundry baskets full of money' (Billerbeck 2015) -'the fear of hyperinflation is printed in the German genome' (Brüderle 2011) . The link between Hitler's rise to power and Germany's inflation drama has been widely discredited (Blyth 2013: 59ff) 4 , notably as the years leading to the Third Reich were marked by recession which was linked with deflation and high unemployment.
Singling out the German experience of runaway price-rises in the 1920s furthermore ignores that other countries share 'memories of high inflation' (Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2009) . Comparing the German hyperinflation of the early 1920s to 64
other periods of worldwide hyperinflation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is evident that the experience of the Weimar Republic is hardly exceptional (Hanke and Krus 2012) . And yet -in more recent years -the preoccupation with inflation of the German population and a significant section of its political class appears comparatively distinctive, exaggerated and, it might be argued, extreme (see Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013) .
Given the strong presence of the term Stability Culture in European politics, it comes as a surprise that no study to date, as far as we are aware, has set out to test the premise on which it rests. Are the populations of Southern European countries less inflation averse than the alleged model pupils of Stability Culture?
Quantifying Stability Culture as inflation aversion
At the heart of Stability Culture is a concern about price stability. As the preceding discussion suggests, the fear of inflation -inflation aversion -has thus been a central yardstick for a country's Stability Culture. In a study on public support for the euro, Banducci et al. (2009: 573) argue that of all economic concepts, citizens do seem to have the greatest understanding of and knowledge about inflation -a claim based on a previous study by Walstad (1997 The discrepancy between actual and perceived inflation rates appears to be persistent. Issing (2006: 211) The sample period of our empirical analysis covers only post-euro years. For our EU sample, the possible effect that Eurozone membership has on inflation knowledge will be controlled for with the 'Euro' dummy. We are therefore confident that the euro-effect does not systematically bias our estimation results. 2) Inflation aversion can also be modelled as the sensitivity of wellbeing to inflation.
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Di Tella et al. (2001) examine how respondents' reports of their wellbeing vary with national levels of unemployment and inflation. Collins and Giazanzzi (1992) adopt a similar approach but with two notable differences. First, they are interested how inflation and unemployment affect respondents' assessment of their general economic condition, not of their happiness. Secondly, and more importantly, instead of using real inflation and unemployment rates, the respondents'
perceptions of changes in price levels and unemployment are taken as the 6 Note also that the measurement of inflation aversion used in this study has as an advantage that the respondents are not asked to make a highly quantitative judgment of price stability itself. (Clarke et al. 1993) . Whilst all of these studies offer insight into the dynamics of a population's attitudes towards inflation, they have the drawback of presenting an indirect measurement of inflation aversion.
3) A third approach is to ask individuals survey questions specifically about inflation. Our approach examines the priority assigned to controlling inflation in relation to both economic and non-economic goals. We base our analysis on Eurobarometer surveys where respondents are asked about the two policy priorities currently facing their country with inflation/maintaining price stability being one possible option. It is likely that the respondents' inflation aversion will be influenced by rising prices.
We compute the rank correlation coefficients between both variables for each of the 
Data and Econometric Model
To analyse the determinants of cross-country variation in public inflation aversion, readily comparable to studies using either model.
Independent variables
To process of mass public opinion (cf. Risse-Kappen 1991). Public opinion was as much a factor in shaping EMU accession (e.g. Gabel 1998) as it was to be won over (e.g.
Collignon and Schwarzer 2003). In both scenarios, the German narrative of Stability
Culture would expect public opinion in Eurozone countries to place a higher priority in the 'fight against inflation'.
We further control for a host of factors at both the individual and the national level.
At the individual level we include the controls AGE (age of respondent),
UNEMPLOYED (unemployment status dummy), EDUCATION (years of education), and MALE (gender dummy). Based on the Barro-Gordon Model (Barro and Gordon 1983), numerous studies have suggested a trade-off between inflation
and unemployment (e.g. Akerlof et al. 1996) . Scheve (2004) finds that inflation aversion decreases with the rise in unemployment, arguing that this was broadly consistent with the specification of utility/loss functions in the literature (see also di Tella et al. 2001) . Inflation has significant redistributive effects. In an attempt to group those disadvantaged and advantaged from inflationary policies -and therefore those more or less inflation averse -it is helpful to look at four key individual-level At the national level we control for the broader economic climate and include the variables INFLATION 11 (the inflation rate), ΔGDP (the change in gross domestic product) and DEBT (national debt to GDP ratio). We include the debt to GDP ratio to control for the allegedly inflationary effects of (unsustainable) debt levels (e.g.
Suzuki 1993
). Governments, so the conventional wisdom goes, would push for inflationary policies to reduce their debt burdens. In monetary union the inflation-11 Empirical results strongly suggest that inflation expectations are the key ingredient of the inflationary process. Paloviita and Viren (2005) find that innovations in expectations account typically for more than one-third of the (forecast) variance of inflation. The main mechanism for this inflation expectations-inflation-loop is wages. When firms and employees negotiate wages and when companies set their prices, they regularly take their inflation expectations into account. If inflation is expected to be high, employees might push for a higher wage increase, firms' costs increase, which in turn could be passed on to customers through higher prices. In short, inflation expectations can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy; if people expect inflation, their behaviour can lead to inflation. To control for this we included various lags of inflation, which resulted in no substantial change of the results. It seems however that people's inflation aversion is determined by their short-term perception of actual inflation as the magnitude of both coefficients declines with every lag introduced, as does its significance. 
Econometric model
For the individual level model we use a logit regression appropriate for the binary nature of our dependent variable. Merging individual-level observations with country-level economic factors introduces the possibility that disturbances will be correlated across countries. Moulton (1990) shows that standard errors from a usual maximum likelihood estimation can be biased seriously downwards if the disturbances are correlated within the groupings that are used to merge individuallevel with country-level data. We therefore cluster standard errors by country. This requires the weaker assumption that errors are independent across countries but not necessarily across survey respondents within a given country. Unit root tests suggest that the series in all models is stationary.
In order to explore the determinants of inflation aversion at the country level we use random effects. Fixed-effects estimations may be better suited in time-series crosssectional data with a time series of T→30 (Judson and Owen 1999 12 The confirmation of the use of a random effects model is in line with our intuition that inflation aversion is influenced by differences across countries. Our main model, where matrices I and E comprise individual and economic controls, is as follows:
Empirical Results

12
The fixed-effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between the countries in the panel, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant characteristics. Time-invariant characteristics of a given country are collinear with the country dummies.
Analysing the causes of inflation aversion across countries, a time-invariant characteristic, like belonging to the SOUTH cluster, cannot cause inflation aversion, because it is constant for each country.
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The logit regression coefficient estimates of the individual level model are reported in Table 2 and random effects coefficient of the country level model are reported in Table 3 . Our results strongly suggest that the distinction between northern states with an allegedly strong and southern states with an allegedly weak Stability Culture, as expressed in high and low inflation aversion, is a myth. In no specification is the SOUTH variable either individually or jointly significant. Conversely, the NORTH variable suggests that this country group puts less priority on the fight against inflation (between 6 and 10% depending on the model).
The results of all models suggest that the economic context has a substantial impact on the public's inflation aversion. As expected, the inflation rate has a strong and significant impact on inflation aversion (cf. Berlemann 2014; Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2012; Scheve 2004 ). We find that higher debt levels lead to an increase in inflation aversion, whereas GDP growth reduces inflation aversion (yet only for our country-level models). The negative and significant coefficient for the UNEMPLOYMENT variable for the Eurozone subsample in the Eurozone logit and both fixed effect models lends credence to the view that high unemployment rates lead to a decrease in inflation aversion. This is line with the existing literature.
Scheve (2004), for instance, argues that as unemployment rises, reducing unemployment becomes a greater priority, achieving which makes rising inflation potentially more acceptable. However, we find that on the individual-level, being unemployed increases the probability of being inflation averse by 1%. Berlemann are less inflation averse than more educated individuals which is in line with, inter alia, van Lelyveld (1999) and Easterly and Fischer (2001) . For every year of education, the probability of being inflation averse is reduced by 1 percent. Contrary to Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006), we find that women are more concerned about price stability then men, which is in line with Berlemann (2014) and Ehrmann and Tzamourani (2012) . However, surprisingly, and contrary to the existing literature, the AGE variable, while statistically significant, has a negative impact on inflation aversion. This result still holds when we split the variable into aggregate groups or include the squared term to model a non-linear relationship. Its marginal effect is small so age does not seem to be a main driver of inflation aversion. Our finding thus suggests that the ageing of national populations should not increase inflation aversion. Furthermore, this result is interesting as it contradicts the view that because inflation aversion is a function of a population's experience with high inflation, popular inflation aversion should decrease with years of price stability (Ehrmann and Tzamourani 2009, although see van Lelyveld 1999) . This is not the case: our data shows that across the EU, inflation aversion is fairly constant over the timespan of this analysis and reached a 9 year high during the Great Recession; and that the younger generation is slightly more likely to be inflation averse than the very old, many of whom lived through periods of high inflation. This finding runs counter to Ehrmann and Tzamourani's concern (2009: 21) that the 'mandate could possibly erode over time, due to the central banks' own successes in taming inflation, thus lowering the sensitivity of the public towards rising prices'.
The marginal effects of our logit model suggest that that inhabitants of the Eurozone are 11 per cent more likely to be inflation averse than inhabitants of EU Member Table 4 , strongly suggest that the positive impact of Eurozone membership on inflation aversion is not due to mistrust in the Central Bank. When using the entire EU sample and including the variable EURO in both EU samples (split again according to trust of the ECB), the coefficients for EURO are statistically identical to those of the full model presented in Table 2 . Results from these two sub-groups furthermore corroborate our main finding challenging the Stability Culture narrative. Respondents in the alleged stronghold of Stability Culture are less inflation averse than the rest of the Eurozone, whether or not they trust the ECB. 
Robustness tests
Conclusion
The assertion of a common European 'Stability Culture' -that is, an economic policy perspective whose primary concern is price stability -was the ideational Note: Eurozone sub-sample, logit regression. The standard errors are country-clustered robust standard errors.* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
